The public apparently recognizes that liberals (e.g., Democrats) and conservatives (e.g., Republicans) differ in their approval of social spending-liberals are pro-, whereas conservatives are anti-government support. What may be less widely recognized by laypersons are the factors that underlie this ideological difference.
Regardless of political orientation, individuals give less personal help and endorse less public assistance to those judged responsible for their plights relative to those perceived as not personally responsible (see reviews in Weiner, 1993 Weiner, , 1995 . For example, when poverty is ascribed to laziness or lack of financial planning, persons endorse less assistance than when it is ascribed to lack of available jobs or illness (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993a; Zucker & Weiner, 1993) . Furthermore, persons believe that it is fair to consider responsibility in distribution decisions (Farwell & Weiner, 1996) . That is, responsibility is accepted as a relevant criterion when assessing deservedness, with those responsible for their plights perceived as less deserving than those who are not responsible (see Feather, 1994) .
The contrasting responses of liberals and conservatives toward the needy in part arise because these groups differ in how responsible they believe others are for their predicaments. Conservatives tend to attribute poverty to causes such as self-indulgence and laziness, whereas liberals are more likely to view the poor as victims of society (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993b; Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock, & Brady, 1986; Zucker & Weiner, 1993) . Furthermore, for any given cause of a situation or condition, conservatives may perceive that cause as more controllable by the individual than will liberals, thereby ascribing greater responsibility to the person in need (Skitka, in press; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; Zucker & Weiner, 1993) . Thus, conservatives and liberals differ both in their attributions of causality and in their interpretations of the same causes. As a consequence of these perceptions and inferences, conservatives may be less aid-giving than their political counterparts. For example, in a study of responses to victims of a natural disaster (flood), Skitka (in press) found that conservatism was associated with perceptions of victims' responsibility for their plight and lower amounts of recommended assistance.
It is also likely that conservatives particularly consider responsibility to be a relevant criterion when determining deservedness. Relative to liberals, conservatives place a greater value on equity (proportionality) rather than on equality as a determinant of resource distribution (Rasinski, 1987; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993b) . Given that responsibility often is an input into equity calculations (Farwell & Weiner, 1996) , it follows that conservatives would more frequently consider it appropriate to distribute rewards based on recipient responsibility (i.e., equitably), withholding resources from those found to be responsible for their needy state.
Although it has been documented that variations in willingness to assist others in part stem from ideology-related patterns of attributions, few investigators have addressed naive beliefs about the relations between ideological orientations, attributions of responsibility, and the distribution of charitable funds (for a recent exception, see Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995) . The two studies reported here were designed to answer a number of questions pertinent to these issues, including the following: (a) Do laypersons recognize that relative to liberals, conservatives withhold assistance from others who are responsible for their plights? (b) Do liberal and conservative persons differ in their beliefs about how other liberals and conservatives respond to those in need? and (c) Do liberal and conservative individuals view themselves as similar to other members of their ideological groups or as differing from them in systematic ways?
To address these and related questions, participants in Study 1, classified according to their self-reported ideology, allocated hypothetical funds to others who were responsible or nonresponsible for some predicament. In addition, the respondents predicted how liberal and conservative others would allocate funds to these persons. In this manner, participants' perceptions of others could be compared with the others' actual self-reports and the accuracy of their perceptions could be determined. In Study 2, a different participant population was used and the generality of the findings of Study 1 was explored.
STUDY 1

Method
Participants. Ninety-six students taking an undergraduate course in psychology completed the materials at the end of a regularly scheduled class meeting. Participation was voluntary and the respondents were assured of their anonymity.
Materials and procedure. Participants received three need vignettes, each describing two potential recipients as unemployed, having an obesity-related medical problem, or ill with AIDS. These three needs (stigmas) were chosen because they represent a range of need states that could be readily manipulated with respect to personal responsibility (see Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988) . Within each need condition, two persons were described, one who was responsible and one who was nonresponsible for his or her problem. In the unemployment vignette, the responsible individual was described as losing a job because of poor work habits, whereas the nonresponsible person lost a job because the employer went out of business; in the obesity vignette, the responsible person was described as obese due to a poor diet and lack of exercise, whereas the nonresponsible person was obese because of a thyroid disorder; and in the AIDS vignette, the responsible person acquired AIDS through promiscuous, heterosexual sex, whereas the nonresponsible person had AIDS because of a transfusion of contaminated blood (see Weiner et al., 1988) .
For all of the vignettes, respondents were asked to imagine that they were on the board of directors of a charitable organization. They indicated how much financial assistance they would recommend for the potential fund recipients. They also were asked to predict how much assistance a politically liberal classmate on the board and a politically conservative classmate on the board would recommend. Thus, each participant made 18 ratings (3 Need Vignettes × 2 Levels of Responsibility × 3 Perspectives-own, conservative, and liberal classmate). Reported helping was assessed on 11-point scales anchored at the extremes with least amount of money possible and greatest amount of money possible. This within-participants design was ecologically valid because in real allocation decisions, judges must often distinguish between more and less deserving claimants. Furthermore, by reducing participant variance and increasing power, the design increased our ability to detect differences between participants' beliefs about their own versus others' responses to the needy.
Participants were classified as liberal, middle of the road (MOR), or conservative based on their response to a single 9-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. This one item was not assumed to be a precise measure of ideological position. However, prior research has shown that such single-item scales are associated with more comprehensive measures of ideological orientation (see Skitka & Tetlock, 1993b) . Thirty-five participants described themselves as liberal (1 to 3 on the scale), 44 as MOR (4 to 6 on the scale), and 17 as conservative (7 to 9 on the scale). Thus, as anticipated with this college sample, the distribution was skewed in a liberal direction.
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Results and Discussion
In presenting the data, we will proceed as follows. First, reports of own assistance are examined. This is followed by participants' predictions of the assistance awarded by others. Then we evaluate the accuracy of these predictions. For all the following analyses, the data from the three kinds of need states were combined because type of need did not qualify any of the patterns of findings reported here.
Reports of own assistance. As expected, there was a significant main effect documenting that the nonresponsible needy were awarded more funds than were those who were responsible for their plights, F(1, 93) = 568.09, p < .001 (see Table 1 ). This result replicates a robust finding. Greater generosity toward the nonresponsible has been shown to be mediated by stronger affective reactions of sympathy toward these individuals (see review in Weiner, 1995) . Of greater importance here, there was a significant interaction between the participant's ideology, the participant's perspective, and the responsibility of the recipient, F(4, 186) = 3.90, p < .01. As shown in Table 1 (left side), the three ideological groups differed in their reported responses to responsible recipients such that liberals' self-reports of the amount of assistance they would give (M = 5.19) were higher than the self-reports of MORs (M = 4.20), t(77) = 2.38, p < .05, d = 0.54, or of conservatives (M = 3.86), t(50) = 2.24, p < .05, d = 0.66. It is evident from Table 1 that the three ideological groups did not differ in their self-reported reactions to nonresponsible recipients (all ts < 1.00).
Predictions of assistance by others. All persons expected liberals to be more helpful than conservatives, whether recipients were responsible for their plights (Ms = 6.32 vs. 2.57), t(95) = 14.82, p < .001, d = 1.51, or not responsible (Ms = 8.94 vs. 7.71), t(95) = 5.27, p < .001, d = 0.54. However, as shown in Table 1 (middle), conservative participants predicted that liberals would be more generous toward responsible recipients (M = 7.61) than did MOR (M = 5.99), t(59) = 3.06, p < .01, d = 0.87, and liberal participants (M = 6.11), t(50) = 2.41, p < .05, d = 0.71. We label this finding the "Limbaugh Effect" after the conservative media personality who has acquired fame as a critic of liberal excess. When predicting the responses of liberals toward recipients who were not responsible for their need states, conservative (M = 9.41) and MOR (M = 8.73) respondents did not differ from each other, t(59) = 1.53, ns, d = 0.44, and conservative and liberal respondents (M = 8.99) also did not differ in these predictions, t(52) = 1.21, ns, d = 0.36 (see Table 1 ).
Turning next to inferences about the beneficence of conservatives, conservative (M = 2.25) and MOR (M = 2.76) respondents did not differ in their predictions of the responses of conservatives toward the responsible, t(59) = 1.25, ns, d = 0.36, and conservatives and liberals (M = 2.47) also did not differ in these predictions, t(50) = .59, ns, d = 0.18. Likewise, conservative (M = 8.00) and MOR (M = 7.63) respondents did not differ in their predictions of the responses of conservatives toward the nonresponsible, t(59) = .62, ns, d = 0.18, and conservatives and liberals (M = 7.68) also did not differ in these predictions, t(50) = .51, ns, d = 0.15 (see Table 1 ).
Accuracy of the predictions about others. Thus far we have examined self-reports of recommended assistance (liberals state that they would be more charitable toward those responsible for their need states than would others) and perceptions regarding what help others would Farwell, Weiner / LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGIES 847 give (persons believe that, overall, liberals are more generous than conservatives). Furthermore, we have described the Limbaugh Effect (conservative persons especially view liberals as generous toward the responsible). We now consider the accuracy of inferences about the generosity of others by comparing predictions with self-reports (see Table 1 ). Given a responsible recipient, the actual (i.e., selfreported) assistance by liberals (M = 5.19) was overestimated by all ideological groups, including other liberals (M = 6.11), t(34) = 4.08, p < .001, d = 0.69; MORs (M = 5.99), t(77) = 1.86, p < .07, d = 0.42; and conservatives (M = 7.61), t(50) = 3.89, p < .001, d = 1.15. Recall that liberals were, in fact, more charitable toward the responsible than were the other ideological groups. However, as revealed above, they were not as generous as others expected them to be. One may conclude from these findings that beliefs about liberals, and the Limbaugh Effect in particular (i.e., beliefs held by conservatives), are exaggerations of a kernel of truth. That is, the stereotype has some justification but also some degree of inaccuracy. In contrast, it is evident from Table 1 that given a nonresponsible recipient, the self-reported assistance by liberals (M = 9.01) was predicted fairly accurately by all three ideological groups.
Turning now from predictions about liberals to inferences regarding conservatives, their financial decisions were uniformly underestimated by all three ideological groups. Given a responsible recipient, conservatives' self-reports of recommended financial assistance (M = 3.86) were underestimated by liberals (M = 2.47), t(50) = 3.05, p < .01, d = 0.90; by MORs (M = 2.76), t(59) = 2.34, p < .05, d = 0.67; and even by other conservative respondents (M = 2.25), t(16) = 3.42, p < .01, d = 0.83. Note that conservatives were, in fact, relatively less willing to help the responsible than were the other ideological groups. Thus, the pattern of results again suggests an exaggeration of a kernel of truth, although there is no parallel to the Limbaugh Effect, that is, there was not a stronger tendency among liberals to perceive conservatives as stingy.
Given a nonresponsible recipient, conservatives' recommended helping (M = 9.14) was again underestimated by liberal (M = 7.68), t(50) = 2.59, p < .05, d = 0.77, as well as by MOR (M = 7.63), t(59) = 2.85, p < .01, d = 0.81, and conservative (M = 8.00), t(16) = 2.74, p < .05, d = 0.67, respondents. However, these inferences were not an exaggeration of a kernel of truth inasmuch as conservatives did not differ from the other ideological groups in their generosity toward the nonresponsible. The data thereby reveal a shared, inaccurate stereotype of a somewhat heartless conservative who denies funds to all others, even those who do not cause their personal plights.
To review the findings, liberals endorse more assistance to those responsible for their problems than do other ideological groups (see also Skitka, in press). Furthermore, all groups predict that liberals will be more beneficent toward the responsible needy than they actually are (an exaggerated kernel of truth). This tendency is particularly pronounced among conservatives (the Limbaugh Effect). Although conservatives endorse less funding for those responsible for their plights than do others, all groups overestimate this stinginess (again, a kernel of truth). But in the case of a nonresponsible needy recipient, there is no kernel of truth underlying the belief expressed by all ideological groups that conservatives are more withholding toward such blameless individuals.
Further self-other comparisons and implications for self-enhancement. Now we focus on a different and somewhat more speculative issue, namely, how the pattern of responses reveals what may be construed as selfenhancement on the part of the respondents. We examine this issue by considering beliefs about own charitability as they compare with the perceived charitability of others.
A significant two-way interaction was obtained between respondent perspective and recipient responsibility, F(2, 186) = 54.48, p < .001 (see Figure 1) . This interaction stems from the finding that all participants, regardless of ideology, reported that they would be more generous than would conservatives, whether recipients were responsible (M self = 4.50, M conservatives = 2.57), t(95) = 9.51, p < . 0.69, for their needy state. In contrast, participants reported that they would be less charitable than would liberals when recipients were responsible (M self = 4.50, M liberals = 6.32), t(95) = 8.87, p < .001, d = 0.91, but equally generous when the needy were not responsible (M self = 9.02, M liberals = 8.94). These results suggest that when helping responsible others, persons view themselves as compromising between the stingy behavior of conservatives and the spendthrift behavior of liberals. This middle-ground position characterizes the self-reports of all three ideological groups. However, this pattern of data is not sufficient to presume the presence of a self-enhancement motive (for a related discussion, see Colvin & Block, 1994) . These data add an interesting qualification to the reported finding that persons believe themselves to be more benevolent and giving than others (see, e.g., Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985) . In our previous research (Farwell & Weiner, 1996 , Experiment 6), we asked persons to report how charitable they would be toward persons with AIDS who were more and less responsible for their condition. We also asked them to predict the charitability of their college peers. In this earlier study, persons reported that they would be more generous than generalized others, regardless of the responsibility of the needy individual. To the contrary, in the present case, our respondents viewed themselves as less benevolent than specific others, namely liberals, but only in certain contexts (i.e., toward those responsible for their problems). The most apparent explanation for this finding is that persons consider the greater benevolence of liberals excessive and unwarranted when it is bestowed on the undeserving. This perhaps defines the meaning of a bleeding heart liberal-an individual whose generosity is inappropriate, not judicious, and indiscriminate. Consistent with this interpretation is the fact that study participants reported that both they and conservatives would distinguish more strongly between responsible versus nonresponsible recipients than would liberals (differences between Ms of assistance = 2.62 for liberals vs. 4.52 for self), t(95) = 8.38, p < .001, d = 0.86 (M = 5.14 for conservatives), t(95) = 8.09, p < .001, d = 0.83. STUDY 2 In Study 2, we sought to replicate and extend the findings just reported. The design and execution of Study 2 were similar to that of Study 1, with the following modifications: (a) a sample in addition to traditional college students was included; (b) participants responded to only one vignette in a partially between-participants design; (c) to explore the generality of social perceptions, persons did not predict the responses of college peers but rather of extreme liberals and extreme conservatives; and (d) responses of persons self-identifying as MOR were not included. In Study 1, the single largest category of respondents included those self-identifying as MOR. Furthermore, the responses of MOR participants were not systematic, in some cases resembling those of liberals and in other cases resembling those of conservatives (see Table 1 ). It is possible that this pattern occurred because some persons who checked the midpoint of the ideology scale do not truly consider themselves to be moderate but rather simply do not think of themselves in ideological terms. To reduce the number of MOR participants, the ideology scale was compressed from a 9-point to a 7-point scale. Data from persons who described themselves using the single midpoint of the scale were then excluded from the analyses.
Method
Participants. Two samples were recruited. One was composed of 149 persons from an introductory psychology class. Students participated during their first regularly scheduled class. The materials were completed as part of a packet that included a large number of unrelated investigations conducted by other researchers. The second sample was composed of 103 persons from a college education program for working adults. The average age of this sample was 32.2 years. Participation was part of a class discussion of political ideology. For both samples, participation was voluntary and respondents were assured of their anonymity.
Materials and procedure.
Each participant received one of three vignettes in which two potential recipients were described as being in need, with the vignettes identical to those used in Study 1. Using 11-point scales, respondents indicated how much assistance they would recommend and how much assistance a very liberal/left-wing board member and a very conservative/right-wing board member would recommend. Each participant made six ratings (2 Levels of Recipient Responsibility × 3 Perspectives-own and extreme liberal and extreme conservative board member) in one of three vignettes. The orders of responsible versus nonresponsible recipient and own versus other's perspective were counterbalanced.
Participants themselves were classified as liberal or conservative based on their responses to a single 7-point scale anchored at extremely liberal and extremely conservative. Self-ratings of 1 to 3 were classified as liberal; ratings of 5 to 7 were classified as conservative. Persons who described themselves as neither liberal nor conservative (i.e., using a 4) were not included in the analyses. Of the traditional college sample, 55 described themselves as liberal, 44 as conservative, and 50 were not included because they described themselves as neither. Of the working adults, 30 described themselves as liberal, 36 as conservative, and 37 as neither. Thus, as expected, proFarwell, Weiner / LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGIES 849 portionally fewer working adults described themselves as liberal relative to traditional college students.
Results and Discussion
One goal of this study was to generalize the findings of Study 1 to a different sample. Although our sample of working adults also was enrolled in college courses, they were older than is typical of college students and, as noted, were less likely to describe themselves as liberal. Despite these differences, in this study, we found no interactions with sample as a factor. These results are encouraging regarding the generality of the findings. For the following analyses, we have combined the data from our two samples.
Reports of own assistance. There was no significant main effect of the participant's ideology on reported assistance (see Table 2 ). There was, however, a significant interaction between participant's ideology, participant's perspective, and recipient's responsibility, F(2, 326) = 5.70, p < .01. As shown in Table 2 (left side), liberals' reports of their generosity toward the responsible needy (M = 5.11) were higher than were conservatives' reports (M = 3.80), t (163 Predictions of assistance by others. As shown in Table 2 (right half), again liberal and conservative participants expected liberals to be more helpful than conservatives whether recipients were responsible for their condition (Ms = 6.67 vs. 2.43), t(164) = 14.70, p < .001, d = 1.14, or nonresponsible (Ms = 8.83 vs. 6.55), t(164) = 8.25, p < .001, d = 0.64. In addition, comparing predictions made by liberal and conservative respondents revealed a nonsignificant trend, replicating the data in Study 1 that conservatives expect extreme liberals to be more generous toward responsible recipients than do liberals (Ms = 7.00 and 6.35, respectively), t(163) = 1.44, p = .15, d = 0.22. This is consistent with our definition of the Limbaugh Effect. Finally, because persons were predicting responses of extreme others (as opposed to classroom peers), the accuracy of their predictions could not be determined as was done in Study 1.
Implications for self-enhancement. A significant interaction between recipient's responsibility and perspective was obtained, F(2, 326) = 28.26, p < .001. Participants reported that they would be more generous than extreme conservatives, whether recipients were responsible (Ms = 4.47 vs. 2.43), t(164) = 9.10, p < .001, d = 0.71, or nonresponsible (Ms = 8.48 vs. 6.55), t(164) = 8.90, p < .001, d = 0.69. In contrast, participants reported that they would be less generous than extreme liberals when recipients were responsible (Ms = 4.47 vs. 6.67), t(164) = 8.63, p < .001, d = 0.67, but equally generous when the needy were not responsible (Ms = 8.48 vs. 8.83), t(164) = 1.83, ns, d = 0.14. Taken together, the data again suggest that persons perceive themselves as appropriately generous, in contrast to extreme liberals who are inappropriately generous and extreme conservatives who are inappropriately stingy. These results are again consistent with the data from Study 1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We began the above two studies with a number of questions concerning how conservatives and liberals behave and view others. The evidence reveals that conservatives are less generous toward the undeserving needy. Furthermore, persons do recognize that conservatives tend to withhold resources from those responsible for their needs, although they also tend to overestimate the extent to which conservatives exhibit such withholding. In addition, persons erroneously view conservatives as being relatively unhelpful toward persons who are nonresponsible for their problems (see Lakoff, 850 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1996, for a relevant discussion), with own ideology not differentially related to perceptions of conservatives. In contrast, liberals are perceived as helpful but less judicious, a perception that is, in fact, based on a kernel of truth. However, conservatives, in particular, have an exaggerated view of liberals as generous toward the responsible. Hence, conservatives are less accurately perceived and are less accurate as perceivers. The above findings may be framed more broadly in terms of fundamental personality traits. Viewed from the perspective of the Big Five, it appears that liberals and conservatives are thought to differ in terms of agreeableness and conscientiousness (see Costa & McCrae, 1992) . Both liberals and conservatives hold a stereotyped image of a relatively disagreeable conservative. Although liberals are perceived as relatively agreeable, both ideological groups seem to view them as less conscientious or at least as demanding less conscientiousness from others. Persons' beliefs about ideology and these broad dimensions of personality is an interesting area for future exploration. In addition, investigating beliefs about liberals' and conservatives' responses to positive scenarios, such as rewards given for positive actions, could further elucidate this analysis.
Finally, persons do not regard themselves as representative of their own ideological groups. They view themselves as resembling conservatives-judicious in their use of responsibility when deciding to help others. Yet they also report resembling liberals when generosity is appropriate. Thus, persons appear to claim the positive characteristics of both liberals and conservatives.
The above findings are consistent with other data recently reported in the literature. For example, Robinson et al. (1995) asked liberal and conservative college students how sympathetic they felt toward the Black victim and White perpetrators in a racially motivated assault (Howard Beach incident) and to predict how sympathetic other liberals and conservatives would be toward these persons. Consistent with the present data, liberals were more sympathetic toward the Black victim than were conservatives. Furthermore, both liberals and conservatives overestimated liberals' sympathy toward the victim and underestimated conservatives' sympathy toward him. Both liberals and conservatives saw themselves as falling between these (exaggerated) liberal and conservative extremes. In a later study, Robinson and Keltner (1996;  see also Keltner & Robinson, 1997) asked traditionalist and revisionist English professors to select the 15 books they would use in an introductory English course and to predict what 15 books their opponents would use. Although the two groups actually agreed on 7 of the 15 books (e.g., Macbeth, The Canterbury Tales), both groups underestimated this overlap. Consistent with the Limbaugh Effect described here, traditionalists were especially inaccurate in predicting the book selections of revisionists, expecting them to choose only books by women and minorities.
To account for their findings, Keltner and Robinson put forth three alternative explanations. These may be described as follows: (a) the status quo hypothesis (see Keltner & Robinson, 1997) , (b) the lone moderate explanation (see , and (c) the polarization heuristic (see Keltner & Robinson, 1997) . When applied to the present data, however, these explanations do not receive full support. According to the status quo hypothesis, majority/dominant group members tend to exaggerate their opponents' extremism. But in Study 1, college-aged conservatives were numerically in the minority yet they evinced the most exaggerated perceptions of others (i.e., the Limbaugh Effect). According to the lone moderate explanation, persons are unwilling to endorse their own group's extreme, ideologically driven position. But in both Studies 1 and 2, persons saw themselves as equal to liberals in terms of the extremity of their generosity toward the blameless. Thus, persons did not always characterize themselves as taking middle-ground positions (see Figure 1) . Finally, the polarization heuristic describes persons' tendencies to exaggerate the differences between different ideological groups. But in the present data, participants' perceptions of conservatives and liberals were polarized strongly only in the case of reactions to the responsible (see Tables 1 and 2 ) as compared with reactions to the nonresponsible needy.
We believe that the most parsimonious explanations for the present findings are the prevailing stereotypes of liberals and conservatives. These stereotypes were nicely captured by the commentator who described the political spectrum as "liberals without brains to conservatives without hearts" (Cooper, 1996) . In more psychological terms, liberals and conservatives are thought to differ in their characteristic benevolence and in the degree to which they modify their help-giving based on perceived causes of others' predicaments. In short, liberals are perceived as generous but not judicious, conservatives as judicious but not generous, and the self as both generous and judicious, regardless of own ideology.
The present findings are reminiscent of those found by Korte (1972) in a study of Vassar students' "pluralistic ignorance" (see also Miller & Prentice, 1994) . In that study, students described themselves as less liberal than their college peers with respect to several political and social issues. Students' misperceptions of the campus norm seem to have been based on their familiarity with the views of an atypically liberal and vocal minority of students and faculty. Students' discussions among themselves were apparently not sufficient to inform them that these salient views were not representative of the college Farwell, Weiner / LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGIES 851 as a whole. In a similar manner, participants in the present study underestimated the degree to which their own responses were normative for their ideological groups. Regarding the current findings, it is possible that study participants acquired their stereotypes of liberals and conservatives from images created by political rhetoric; such images are frequent and memorable. For example, during the 1988 presidential election, George Bush "accused" Michael Dukakis of being a liberal. One may speculate that Bush was attempting to invoke (among liberals and conservatives alike) the image of a nonjudicious individual prone to coddling the undeserving. Conservative politicians also seem sensitive to perceptions of their own group as unsympathetic. This concern was evidenced by Jack Kemp, who declared himself a "conservative with a heart," and more recently by George W. Bush who has advocated "compassionate conservatism."
Clearly, perceptions of liberal and conservative ideologies are multidimensional; characteristic generosity and use of responsibility in evaluating the needy are only part of these perceptions. However, generosity and concern for responsibility form a core around which conceptions of ideology may be organized. This principle is revealed by their ubiquity in descriptions of ideology and is illustrated by the following joke:
Question: Was Skinner a liberal or a conservative?
Answer: Neither. Liberals don't understand contingencies and conservatives don't understand reinforcement.
